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gives prima facie plausibility to established social practices. In cases of 
massive and persistent conflict between two such practices, Alston pro-
poses that we give preference to the one that is more firmly established. 
Brown argues that in the case of religious belief systems, we can fall into 
a relativistic bog in attempting to determine which is more established-
e.g., which is more compatible with the contemporary scientific enter-
prise. Unfortunately, this leads Brown to focus on the plausibility of the 
miracle stories in Christianity compared with those in an imagined rival 
religion. It may be that there is not much to choose from if we take such 
claims in isolation and ask which is the more "bizarre." But that project 
distracts us from Alston's larger insight that we might judge which prac-
tices are established by looking at historical and other evidence, includ-
ing their fit with other things we already believe, the cultural institutions 
and practices they have given rise to, and so on. 
Religious Experience and Religious Belief. George Wall. Lanham, New 
York, and London: University Press of America, 1995. Pp. vii and 340. 
$51.50 cloth, $39.50 paper. 
J. KELLENBERGER, California State University, Northridge. 
There are, some say, two kinds of people in the world: those who like 
noise and those who do not, or those who chew gum and those who do 
not. In the same vein, we might observe, there are two kinds of religious 
philosophers: those who ground their philosophical reflections in reli-
gious sensibility (some strain of religious sensibility) and proceed to 
philosophical issues concerning religion, and those who ground their 
philosophical reflections in philosophical theory and proceed to philo-
sophical issues concerning religion. My dichotomous comment is on 
religious philosophers, religious philosophers of religion, not on all 
philosophers of religion. That is, my comment is on philosophers of reli-
gion who have religious sensibilities and, being religious, have some 
sympathy for religion. Though they all have religious sensibilities, not 
all start with those sensibilities in their philosophical reflections. Some 
do, but some start with philosophical theory. 
George Wall starts with theory. Early on (p. 12) he states his accep-
tance of the innocent-until-proven-guilty or reliable-until-defeated epis-
temology of William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne. 
But at the same time Wall, via an appreciation of the approach of 
William James, draws deeply upon religious phenomena. In this respect 
he is unlike most analytic philosophers. Like James's Varieties, Wall's 
book contains a collection of actual reported cases of religious experi-
ence. Most of Wall's cases, he tells us, were obtained from the Alister 
Hardy Research Centre in Oxford, England, but many he has gathered 
himself through personal interviews. Although Wall is not presenting 
the cases he considers for their own sake, but rather to argue for his pri-
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mary thesis, the panoply of cases he gives us with an unstinting richness 
of detail provides a phenomenological dimension to his book. 
Wall's main objective is to "consider some proposed general objec-
tions to ([that is, some] proposed general defeaters of) religious experi-
ence as prima facie justification for religious belief" (p. 31). His effort is to 
show that these proposed defeaters, which often take the form of natu-
ralistic explanations of religious experience, do not stand up as general 
defeaters of religious experience as such. The first naturalistic defeater 
he considers is background religious teaching. Wall distinguishes three 
separable theses involved in the claim that religious background 
accounts for religious experience and so defeats it as justification for 
belief: (1) Thesis C, that the content of religious experience, what one 
perceives God to be, is explicitly present in one's previous religious 
teaching; (2) Thesis 0, that a necessary condition for one's having a reli-
gious experience is one's having been taught that religious experience of 
that sort is valuable; and (3) Thesis P, that a necessary condition for 
one's having a religious experience is one's having a positive attitude 
toward religion. By appealing to an array of actual occurrences of reli-
gious experiences, Wall is able to present counterexamples to each of 
these three theses and so to argue that religious backgound does not 
stand up as a general defeater. 
He goes on to argue similarly - via counterexamples - against other 
proposed naturalistic defeaters: conscious desire and unconscious desire 
and motivation. In addition he considers and argues against several 
proposed defeaters that do not fall under the heading of naturalistic 
explanations of religious experience. One such is embodied in the claim 
that religious experience does not have the effect it should if it were an 
encounter with the Divine. Again Wall presents concrete cases from 
which he concludes that while people respond in a variety of ways to 
religious experience, in the majority of these representative cases there 
were positive immediate or long-term effects (e.g., joy, peace, and 
increased sensitivity to others). Another proposed defeater is that there 
is no "overrider system" regarding religious experience: that is, religious 
experience is defeated generally as justification for religious belief 
because there are no specific defeaters of religious experience - no crite-
ria for genuine religious experience. But, Wall argues, there are such cri-
teria (e.g., consistency with authoritative teaching, and doxastic moral 
practice), and, he argues, these are not criteria for Christian Doxastic 
Practice (CMP) alone, but for Universal Religious Doxastic Practice 
(URP). 
The last proposed defeater that he considers is that if there is URP 
then we will end up with conflicting religious beliefs justified on the 
basis of religious experiences that will qualify as genuine religious expe-
riences. Wall considers two conflicts: the first is over whether God, or 
Ultimate Reality, is personal or impersonal, and the second is over the 
superiority of a particular religion over other religions. Regarding the 
first, he argues that religious experiences of God as essentially personal 
or impersonal are rare, and as long as such cases are limited, even 
though they are irresolvable, they no more constitute a general defeater 
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of religious experience than irresolvable conflicts in reports of sense per-
ception contitute a general defeater of sense experience as justification 
for belief. Regarding the second, he argues that it is rare for religious 
experience to give rise to claims to religious superiority, and, in any case, 
such a conflict may be resolvable. 
There is much in the details of Wall's discussion and argument that 
invites criticism or praise, but I shall limit myself to a few general com-
ments. 
I think that Wall may be underestimating the sublety of the uncon-
scious and the ways it can precipitate belief and experience and can 
color experience. He argues that "we should not suppose unconscious 
desire for God to be different from conscious desire, unless we have spe-
cific evidence to the contrary" (p. 97). But proponents of the view that 
religious belief is created by unconscious desires, like Nietzsche and oth-
ers, believe there is an abundance of such evidence. Wall asks why, if 
there is an unconscious desire for forgiveness, the unconscious would 
not be more direct in conveying a sense of forgiveness - why would it 
bother to project a sense of the Presence of God? Why indeed! To bor-
row and redirect some lines of Emerson's: "They reckon ill who leave 
me out" - "They know not well the subtle ways / I keep, and pass, and 
turn again." It is Brahman speaking in Emerson's poem, but we may 
pay the same courtesy to the unconscious. If unconscious desire is 
working behind the scenes to produce the kinds of religious experiences 
Wall considers, or just the sense of God's presence, it may well be 
shrouded in self-deception - a category that Wall does not really deal 
with. And the same thing can be said for a desire that there not be a 
God. It is perhaps because Wall starts with a theory of justification for 
religious belief that is analogous to a theory of justification for perceptu-
al beliefs that he, at one point, looks for defeaters of religious experience 
that are analogous to specific defeaters of sensory perception. With a 
different stating point he might have given more importance to self-
decption and its hidden, unconscious motivation. 
Nevertheless, within the domain of its working space, Wall's book is 
effective. It is a strength of Wall's book that he considers in detail a 
number of actual cases of religious experience, and, as well, the back-
ground of the subject and the expectations, hopes, and beliefs of the sub-
ject before the experience, and, sometimes, the subsequent change or 
lack of change in the subjects's life. This makes his treatment notewor-
thy and valuable if for no other reason than that it provides some useful 
data for philosophical reflection. I say "useful" for I think that Wall, like 
James, is right that reflection on actual cases of religious experience 
should not be an embarrassment to philosophical reflection on the char-
acter of, or the epistemological credentials of, religious experience. It is 
on the basis of the concrete cases he presents that he is able to argue 
against Theses C, 0, and P. 
In addition, drawing upon these concrete cases, Wall can substantiate 
futher points of religious and philosophical significance about the char-
acter of religious experience. For instance, he is able to show that, as a 
matter of fact, religious experience of different sorts can occur in a par-
BOOK REVIEWS 119 
ticular culture. He presents experiences of several subjects who stand in 
the Western theistic - specifically Christian - tradition, who neverthe-
less had experinces of the Divine in a more Eastern impersonal form, 
and he presents some cases of subjects who had experiences of the 
Divine as personal and at other times as impersonal. Pretty clearly, as 
Wall appreciates, these phenomena have implications for the kind of 
view of religious experience that Steven Katz has defended (not that 
Wall argues Katz is altogether wrong). 
Wall's book is the fruit of both reflection and collection, and is per-
sonal in the sense that all sensitive philosophical treatments of religious 
phenomena are personal (in Wall's case he cites as one among many his 
own religious experience). Despite the lack of an index, this book makes 
a nice contribution to the literature on religious experience and belief. 
At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol 
Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II. Kenneth L. Schmitz. Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1994. Pp. x and 170. $24.95 (Cloth), $11.95 
(Paper). 
PATRICIA SAYRE, Saint Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana 
Whatever one might think of the policies and pronouncements of Karol 
Wojtyla, Pope John Paul II, there can be no doubt that he is an important 
public figure and an extraordinary individual. The most traveled pope 
in the history of the church, his gifts as a linguist have enabled him to 
communicate directly with an astonishing range of audiences in a wide 
variety of native tongues. At the same time as he has cultivated a global 
presence, his deep commitment to his own homeland has drawn him 
into secular politics at a crucial moment in Polish history, making him a 
key player in the dismantling of communism in Eastern Europe. In addi-
tion, Wojtyla is a man of letters whose output as a writer has been enor-
mous. His recent book, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, has become an 
international best seller, and his encyclicals have sparked passionate 
debate both within the church and without. Many of his most controver-
sial teachings have to do with issues of personal and specifically sexual 
morality, but, as he made clear in his most recent encyclical, 
"Evangelium Vitae," these teachings are not isolated policy statements 
but flow from an overarching vision of a "culture of life" that is the 
church's alternative to what he describes as the currently prevailing 
"culture of death." 
Kenneth L. Schmitz, in At the Center of the Human Drama: The 
Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II, is more inter-
ested in tracing the origins of the philosophical vision underlying 
Wojtyla's papal teachings than he is with controversial aspects of the 
teachings themselves. At the heart of his book is a carefully considered 
interpretation of The Acting Person, a text Schmitz takes to be the most 
